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AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS VERSUS 'RAWHIDE AND RAINBOW':l

A NOTE ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

BY PREXY NESBITT
PROGRAM SECRETARY

PCR

This article reflects the views of the author and not
necessarily these of the wee or PCR. The author wishes to
acknowledge the contribution made by Dr. Kevin Danaher of
the Institute for Policy Studies. This article is part of
larger work on US policy in Africa which we are currently
writing.
1 According to the Observer of London "Rawhide and Rainbow" were the
code names used by the US Secret Service during 1981 when it
referred to President Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy. It is
signific a nt to note that one of the Fir.st Lady's inaugural acts
upon moving into the White House in 80% black Washington, D.C.
was t o p u rchase a handgun to keep on her bedstand table.

~h e strugg l e to li be r a t e p oli t icall y the rema ining bastions of
colon i a lis m in Sou thern Afri6a, Namibia and South Africa, and the
s t r u g g le to li be rate economically all of Africa are now confronting
a n ew o b st acl e , name ly, the Ronald Re agan administration.
The Reaga n a d mi ni s tration has unabashedly jumped into bed ~ ith the
a partheid r eg i me . A docume nt recently released to the world .' s :·press
da ted May 14, 1981 shows Ass i s t a nt S~c r e tary of State for Africa,
Chester Crocker op i n ing tb S~~ re t ary bf State Haigh the f ollowing
highl y r evea li ng t h ought s :
"A r e la tionsh i p ini ti ated on a cooperative basis could
mo v e fo rward towa r d a future in which S6uth Africa retu r n s to a p l ace w~thin the regional framework of Western
s ec u r ity in te re sts . . . We can work to end South Africa's
polecat st at us in the wo rld and s eek to restore its place
as a l egitimate a n d i mpor tant regional actor with whom we
: c a n : cobp erate pragmati c al ly. Y □-u will also need to respond
wi t h a n artful comb i nat ion of ge s t u r es and hints. The
g es tures would include , as describe d in the attached paper,
s mal l but c o ncre t e s teps s uch as the norma lization of our
mi l i tar y attac h e r e l at ionship. 112
How d o we e x plain th i s political alliance? Many would say that it
c a n be ana l y zed i n terms of the current needs for capital, in terms
of th e East-West co n f lic t. The Re a ga n administration, however,
present s us with a n ew s itu a tion. We would be remiss if ·we failed
to recogn ize the conne c tio n be tween the Reagan administra t ion's
f or eign po l icy o f raci sm and its domest ic policy of raci s m. It
i s n ow clear t hat the current US admin is tration intends to roll
bac k all th e hi stor i ca l a dv a nc e s which black Americans and other
Thir d Wo r ld p eoples achieve d during the 1960's and 1970's. The
record tr ill ions of do ll ars being pou r ed into the Pentagon and
nucl ear warhe ads are comin g f rom th e wide range of social programs
- the l ibraries , we lfar e a n d unemployme nt bene fits~ school lunch
pr ogr ams , hea lth p l an s, a s si s tance to the elderly - which the
Reag an adm ini stra ti o n h as s t e a d ily e liminated. Rarely before has
r acism been such a c o ns i s t en t componen t of US government policy
formul at ion s .
In a Fa ll 19 80 of f - the - r e cord intervie w, one of Reagan's top
Af ric a ad vi sor s c o mp laine d: "The problem with Reagan is that
all h e kno ws about Souther n Africa is he's on the side of the
whites ." And thi s perspective is pote ntially the most dangerous
thing abou t Reaga n's policie s. For in this time of acute
economi c cri sis the r e is a certain t e rror which is fundamen t ally
shaping the policies and actions of Western capitalist governments.
Today' s wor ld with its flu x and in s ecurity is a virtual seed-bed
for the g r owt h o f racist and repressive state philosophies. As the
empir es collaps e, the empe r ors become-more and more desperate.
Ndveli s t Jame s Baldwin stated it well in PCR Information number 11
when h e said:
"When Ame ricans (and I would add Europeans) look
out on th e world, they see nothing but dark and
menacing s ~r angers who appear to have no sense of
rtiythm at a ll, nor any re s pect or affection for
wh ite people ; and whi te Ame ric ans really do not
k now wh at to mak e of a ll this, exc e pt to increase
th e d ef ense budget." 3
2 Memor a ndum to the Secret a ry of State from Chester A.

Crocker,

p.6.
3 Baldwin, Jame s: "Carter this time: Notes on the House of Bondage",
Th e Nati on, Nove mbe r 1, 1980 reprinted PCR Infor mation number 11,
Ja n u ar y 1981.
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Reagan's Cold-War perspective is myopic even by the traditionally
narrow standards of American anti-Sovietism. "The African problem is
a Russian weapon aimed at us" is Reagan's summary of a continent
whose diversity escapes the mind of a failed Hollywood actor.
Reagan's top aides, though more infof med on African realities,
share the President's racist/pro-apartheid stance. Secretary of
State Haig, recently employed by the arms industry, formerly
served in the Nixon White House, where he is reported to have
pretended to beat drums on the table every time African affairs
· were discussed. Haig sees the US and USSR locked in a "resource
war'' over southern Africa, thus justifying closer ties to Pretoria.
The former National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, was a
lobbyist (1973-74) for the Overseas Companies of Portugal, pushing
for increased US investment in the Portuguese colonies~ Allen also
worked for John King and his Denver-based King Resources which
has mining and oil investments in southern Africa. The Assistant _
Secretary of State for African Affairs and the main architect of
Reagan's iouthern Africa policy, Chester Crocker, is married to a
Rhodesian, owns stock in South African gold mines, and is a longtime supporter of 'Judas' Savimbi. Another key US supporter of
Savimbi is Carl Gershman, formerly of Social Democrats/USA but
now an aide to Jeane Kirkpatrick at the United Nations. The
current US Ambassador to South Africa is an open, acknowledged
apologist for South Africa's apartheid.
Whereas the above facts could be dismissed as mere circumstantial
evidence, the secret State Department. docurne.nts previously cited
"prove beyond a sh a dow of a doubt that the Reagan administ r ation
is clearly against black interests in Africa", according to
Randall Robinson of Trans Africa, the group that first received
the docume nts. The secret memoranda list two major goals of
Reagan policy in Southern Africa: "to foreclose opportunities for
growth of Soviet influence in ·southern Africa", and · "greater
acceptance of South Africa wi~hin the global framework of Western
security." Pretoria has long been lobbying for inclusion in a
South Atlantic version of NATO and now may see its dream become
a reality. While Haig was meeting in Washington last May with
South Africa Foreign Minister Pik Botha, General Vernon Walters,
a former deputy chief of the CIA and a Reagan troubleshooter,
was meeting in Buenos Aires with several Latin American and South
African military leaders. The topic was a South Atlantic military
pact, but the Brazilians, essential to any such alliance, were
reportedly cool to the idea. Angolan oil and other economic and,
cultural ties may prove more important to the Brazilian leaders than
inclusion in a neo-fascist security pact.
One of the leaked documents reports on the April 15-16 meetings
between Crocker, South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan,
and Pik Botha. The memo says that "SAG (South African Governments)'
sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia. Having supported
him this far, it would damage SAG honor if Savimbi is harmed."
Crocker responded to this position by arguing that he sees "no
prospect of military victory for UNITA" but Savimbi's inclusion
in the Angolan governme nt could be achiev e d "by playing on
divisions · in MPLA." The State Department officials believe Savimbi
would be fo rce d to go a long with US pl ans bec ause he is d epe ndent
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on aid from "parties we can directly influence"
reference to Zaire, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia).

(a possible
I,

The tone of the confidential documents is both arrogant a~d
threatening. They brag that "African leaders would have no basis
for resisting" the US plan on Namibia "once they are made to
realize that they can on1y get a Namibia settlement through us."
At another point they declare that us recognition of Angola ''is
out unless the Cubans leave and they (the Angolan government)
cut a deal with Savimbi .•. if they won't play, we have other
options." The documents reveal a basic agreement between
Pretoria and Washington that free elections in Namibia are
finacceptable because they would result in a SWAPO government, an
outcome that Reagan and Botha would .rather do without.
A sample of Reagan administration actions in its first one and
a half years of operation has given us a clear understanding
of where things are:
- pressing for r e peal of the -Clark amendment which outlaws US
support for Savimbi and new efforts to re - vitalize both UNITA
and a new version of FNLA;
- agreeing to train South African Coast Guard personnel;
- cutting all food aid to Mozambiq ue;
- the October 1981 visit to the USA by four South African generals;
- the early 1982 decision by the US Commerce Department permitting
the sale to the South African Air Force of ten turbop r ops for
use as air ambulances;
. the Commerce Department eliminating of licensing restrictions
on sales to the South African police and military of equipment
of a "non-military" nature, e.g., clothing, chemicals,
industrial equipment;
• the relaxing of the restrictions limiting computer sales to
South Africa;.
- the US Immigration Department's efforts to deport South African
poet Denis Brutus and its refusal to let other South Africans,
openly active in anti-apartheid organizing, re-enter the USA
after leaving.
It is certain that the Reagan administration is intent on continuing
in its present direction and in fact, upon deepening its ties to
apartheid. The one possible factor which might limit the love
affair is strong and coherent domestic opposition from within the
USA. Such opposition would necessarily have to come first and
foremost from black Americans.
There is a final observation I would offer. It is that the crass
blatency of the Reagari a dmi n ist r~tion 's embrace of apa rtheid
is it se lf an empowe ring contribution to the Botha regime . Reagan's
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stance, his historically inaccurate, but oft-quoted characterization
of the present leaders of South Africa as world war II allies is
serving to embolden current South African government actions and
further, to encourage greater
collaboration
from other governments
.
'
and multinationals. Thus, it is no accident that in February
this year the largest loan ever given to a South African corporate
borrower was negotiated by the USA's Citicorp. The$ 100 million,
seven year loan went to South Africa's African Explosives and
Chemical Industries (AECI) a firm with two munitions plant in
the Transvaal and a third ~n the Cape.
As a response to Reagan's Africa policies and other developments
like -thi growth of Ku Klux Klan-typ~ groups in the USA, the
Executive Committee of the National Council of Churches, USA
voiced publicly, in May 1981, its "fundamental disagreement
with the new administration's vision of who we are and where
we are gotng''. It was the first time ever that a national US
church body had taken so strong a position. So too must others
throughout the world mobilize and render a strong "NO!" to
Rawhide and Rainbow, for if we hold our peace, the - very ~tones
will cry out.
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